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Introduction 
This paper tests for evidence of rent capture by public-sector 
employees when a dedicated tax for a local public service is enacted.  The use 
of special districts for the provision of specific public services has grown 
increasingly common in recent years.  These districts provide services such as 
water,  sewer,  electric, or transit and typically generate some revenue in 
exchange for provision.  When user fees do not cover costs,  however,  public 
funding from federal,  state,  and local governments makes up the difference. 
This research reports that alternative funding mechanisms and budgeting 
practices appear to provide different opportunities for public-sector unions 
to obtain higher wage rates and payrolls. 
Two distinct types of local public funding are considered: general 
revenues and dedicated taxes.  Districts receiving funding from general 
revenues typically compete with other districts,  departments,  or agencies 
through a budget process for a limited pool of funds raised by traditional 
taxation methods.  In contrast,  agencies that receive earmarked revenues from 
a dedicated tax are assured of funding without the need to justify their 
budget or level of senrice.  Their funding falls outside the traditional local 
budget process,  which is characterized by the comparison of costs and benefits 
of competing uses of public funds.  This lack of competition potentially 
yields increased political and budgetary autonomy.  1 
Proponents of earmarked revenues hold that this type of funding 
permits long-term planning and more efficient operation.  Managers who are not 
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concerned with competing for funds on an annual basis can take a longer-term 
view with respect to capital budgets,  planned expansions,  and other 
operations.  Nevertheless,  the permanent nature of the funding and the lack 
of checks and reviews through a normal budget process also creates 
opportunities for rent capture by public-sector employees and unions through 
higher wages, fringe benefits,  and staffing levels.  These higher costs 
potentially offset any efficiency gains from earmarking and argue for the use 
of traditional budget and financing methods. 
This paper tests whether the enactment of a dedicated tax leads to 
higher payroll and wages for public employees.  Data from-the Section 15 
reporting system administered by the Urban Mass Transportation Administration 
(UMTA)  provide payroll and wage levels for a homogeneous type of employee--bus 
operators--for 165 public transit systems over the period 1982-1985.  By 1985, 
64  of these systems used local dedicated revenue sources to support their 
operations.  I independently collected information on when these taxes were 
enacted and the historical circumstances leading to their enactment.  Eight 
were enacted during the sample period, while the other 56 were enacted during 
the 15 years prior to 1982. 
In the sample,'  average hourly wage rates for public-sector 
operators rise from a pre-tax level of $7.97 to more than $10.00  in the 
two-year period following a tax enactment, and subsequently remain well above 
the average of $8.59 per hour for unionized systems with no dedicated taxes. 
In further analysis, pooled time-series,  cross-section  regressions provide a 
systematic look at the level and time path of payroll and wages following a 
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tax enactment.  The level of dedicated revenues and the time since tax 
enactment are used as independent explanatory variables,  with further controls 
made for local private-sector wage rates,  system size,  unionization,  and 
demographic characteristics. 
A  potentially serious objection to the analysis is that the 
existence of a dedicated tax may be endogenous to the local wage process.  The 
history of these taxes in the local mass-transit industry,  however,  is 
discussed in detail and strongly suggests that the principal determinant for 
the existence of dedicated taxes for transit are state-level policies for 
transit funding.  A more plausible channel for bias is the presence of 
unobserved fixed effects that are correlated with both public-sector  wages and 
dedicated taxes,  such as union strength, the voting power of public employees, 
tastes for good or bad government,  or the local political'  environment.  The 
empirical analysis thus explicitly tests and controls for fixed effects. 
The econometric analysis uses two procedures.  The first is a 
generalized least squares  (GLS) procedure that controls for cross-section 
heteroscedasticity and correlation of errors across time.  The GLS results 
suggest that there are significant and permanent increases of 8  to 10 percent 
in payroll and wages following the enactment of a tax.  These results, 
however,  are potentially biased due to unobserved fixed effects that are 
correlated with both wages and the presence of a dedicated tax.  To control 
for fixed effects,  I use the standard "fixed-effects" or "within-groups" 
estimator,  differencing the cross-section  observations from their individual 
means and running ordinary least squares  (OLS) on the transformed data. 
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correlated fixed effects.  The fixed-effect  results,  however,  suggest an even 
larger impact on payrolls and wages than do the GLS results.  Payroll and 
wages rise a statistically significant 20 percent in the six years following 
the tax enactment, and this increase remains stable over time. 
Simulations of the extent to which the payroll increase represents 
the capture of additional revenues resulting from the dedicated tax suggest 
that immediately following the enactment of a dedicated tax,  transit systems 
expand significantly in size,  revenues,  and payroll.  But while the higher 
size and payroll are stable over time, the additional revenues gradually 
diminish to the point that no significant difference exists after lfc years. 
Holding system size constant,  the results show that total revenues are 
significantly higher in the five-year period following the tax enactment,  but 
decrease steadily from an initial upward shift in the first year.  Payroll, 
however,  rises 20 percent in the five years following tax enactment, then 
drifts upward to a 30-percent higher level by year 10.  Thus, the payroll 
share of revenues initially drops with the surge of new revenues.  But as 
payroll increases, the payroll share then rises from 27 percent at year one to 
almost 40 percent by year 15 of the tax.  In sum,  the results suggest that. 
increases in labor costs eventually absorb all additional net revenues that 
result from enactment of a dedicated tax,  and that these gains are maintained 
in spite of a gradual falloff in revenues over time. 
The paper is organized as follows.  Section I  reviews previous work 
on ability-to-pay  and rent capture and discusses how a dedicated funding 
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on trends in the use of special districts and dedicated taxes nationwide. 
Section I11 discusses the data, including survey results on the use of 
dedicated taxes in the local mass-transit industry.  Section IV presents the 
econometric evidence on changes in payroll and wage rates following the 
enactment of a dedicated tax.  Section V provides additional econometric and 
simulation results on changes in size,  revenues, and payroll share following 
tax enactment.  Finally,  section VI summarizes the conclusions and suggests 
areas for future research. 
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I.  Abilitv-to-Pav and Rent Ca~ture 
Abilitv-to-Pay 
The labor and industrial relations literature includes numerous 
studies on the effect of "ability-to-pay" on wage levels.  Early studies 
hypothesized that,  other things being equal,  the managers of firms in less- 
competitivefiighly profitable industries paid higher wages in order to  lower 
labor turnover rates,  enhance their public image  (Weiss,  1966), improve worker 
morale  (Slichter, 1950), or assure a queue of available workers who can be 
hired to meet increased product demand  (Ross  and Wachter,  1973).  Such high 
wages in less-competitive industries,  however,  can also be interpreted as a 
capture of economic rents by labor.  Furthermore,  workers' gains from 
unionization are potentially higher in less-competitive industries because of 
the presence of rents to be captured and because of lower threat of entry by 
nonunion firms. 
Empirical studies of labor's ability to share in any excess return 
due to product-market power employ cross-industry  comparisons and have 
produced mixed results.  Early analyses using industry concentration as a 
measure of market power include Rapping (1967),  Masters (1969), Haworth and 
Rasmussen (1971), and Ashenfelter and Johnson  (1972).  These studies find no 
statistically significant relationship between market concentration and wages. 
In contrast, Pugel  (1980)  uses profits as a measure of concentration and finds 
that labor receives 7 to 14 percent of the total excess return.  More recent 
studies by Clark (1984),  Ruback and Zimmerman (1984), and Salinger  (1984)  also 
find significant evidence of union rent-sharing using cross-section  data on 
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union workers capture economic rents created by industrywide regulations.  3 
Rose (1987), for example, finds significant declines in union wages resulting 
from deregulation in the trucking industry.  In sum,  a substantial body of 
empirical evidence suggests that private-sector unions are able to capture 
economic rents created through monopoly power and regulation. 
Public-Sector  Rent Capture 
The analysis of rent capture also has a strong tradition in the 
public-choice literature.  Niskanen  (1971, 1975) posits that a bureaucracy 
maximizes the level of service it provides  (and  hence the size of its budget) 
subject to its production constraints and to the resources allocated by its 
political superiors.  Since an agency negotiates with political leaders over a 
total budget as opposed to incremental units of service,  and since the agency 
is often the sole provider of the service,  it can use its monopoly power to 
establish a level of service greater than that desired by voters.  While the 
service-maximizing model implies that bureaucrats minimize production costs 
per unit of service,  models by Migue and Belanger  (1974)  and Orzechowski 
(1977)  explicitly recognize that bureaucrats desire higher wages,  fringe 
benefits, and staff levels and may use their monopoly powers to obtain them. 
Public-sector  unions may share in bureaucratic rents in the same 
way that private-sector unions share economic rents.  Empirical studies, 
however, generally show that public-sector unions have a more moderate effect 
on wages than do their private-sector counterparts.  Freeman's  (1986) 
literature review suggests a public-union  wage premium on the order of 5  1 
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percent.  Gyourko and Tracy  (1988)  control for endogenous choice of both 
government and union status and find a 4  percent public-union wage 
differential, versus 14 percent in the private sector.  Although the ability 
of public unions to raise wages appears limited,  Gyourko and Tracy also find 
(in  a forthcoming article) lower property values in cities that pay their 
public-sector workers relatively high wages.  This suggests that public 
workers' success in raising wages can be interpreted as rent capture from a 
community. 
Earmarking and Rent Ca~ture 
The size of the overall governmental budget in Niskanen-type models 
is larger than socially optimal because budgetary procedures allow bureaus to 
act as price-discriminating revenue maximizers.  However,  the ability to use 
this market power is constrained by competition from other bureaus and by the 
preferences of legislative committees.  Other constraints on local government 
spending,  pointed out by Courant, et al. (1979),  include voters' direct 
referenda on tax collections,  and potential mobility to jurisdictions offering 
alternative expenditure-taxation packages. 
The earmarking of revenues directly affects most of these 
constraints on public employee market power.  First, the lack of alternative 
uses for earmarked revenues weakens the negotiating position of a political 
authority in relation to the designated receiving agency.  Second, many 
dedicated taxes are virtually permanent because periodic voter reapproval is 
4  often not required and because the costs of repeal are high.  Permanent, 
exclusive access to funding should lower the variance of funding and therefore 
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general revenues.  Finally, since most dedicated taxes accrue to regionwide 
special districts, voting with one's  feet entails a relatively high-cost move: 
that is, to another metropolitan area, not just to a neighboring municipality. 
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11.  Trends in S~ecial  Districts and Dedicated Taxes 
Special districts are the fastest-growing form of local government 
in the United States and represent an increasingly important method of 
providing specific local public services,  such as water,  sewers, airports, 
parks, and mass transit.  As shown in table 1,  the number of special districts 
nationwide doubled from 14,405  in 1957 to 28,719  in 1982. They now account for 
35 percent of all governmental units--including states, counties, 
municipalities,  and school districts.  Revenues in real terms rose nearly 500 
percent in the same period, totaling $31 billion in 1982.  Although fees 
collected from users comprise the largest share of revenues  (64  percent in 
1982),  local dedicated taxes are historically the largest component of state 
and local assistance and are surpassed only by federal assistance in the late 
While the share of revenues accounted for by local dedicated taxes 
nationwide is not large overall, those districts that have special tax 
authority depend heavily on it for revenue.  As shown in table 2,  in 1977--the 
last year in which dedicated tax authority status was reported--districts with 
tax authority were similar in budget size to districts without tax authority, 
but received 25 percent of their total revenues from dedicated sources.  While 
this was down from the 33 and 30 percent shares in the 1967 and 1972 census 
years,  respectively,  it represents the dominant source of public assistance in 
these districts.  There is also general evidence of rent capture in districts 
http://clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfm
Best available copy11 
with tax authority.  Wages and salaries accounted for 30.9 percent of revenues 
in these districts as opposed to a 25.9 percent share in districts without tax 
authority. 
While tax authority status by district was not reported in 1982,  a 
rank ordering of special districts by states in terms of the statewide use of 
local dedicated taxes reveals a similar pattern.  As shown in table 3,  for 
special districts in states with the highest use of these taxes,  quintile 5, 
dedicated revenues accounted for 25.1 percent of revenues,  versus 0.3  percent 
for the lowest quintile.  Wages and salaries represent a much higher portion 
of revenues in states where the use of dedicated taxes is widespread, 
accounting for 30.2 percent in the highest quintile versus an average of 20.5 
percent in the lowest three quintiles,  again suggesting that the use of these 
taxes presents opportunities for rent capture. 
In summary,  special districts are an increasingly common form of 
government,  and dedicated taxes are the largest source of public funding for 
these districts from the state and local sector.  In states in which these 
taxes are predominantly used, revenues from dedicated taxes exceed federal 
assistance as well.  Wages and salaries in districts with dedicated tax 
authority on average constitute a higher share of revenues compared to 
districts without tax authority.  This evidence of rent capture is seen in 
government censuses from 1967 through 1982. 
There are several explanations other than rent capture, however, 
for the differences in wage shares.  The heterogeneous output mix across 
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dedicated taxes tend to produce output that requires labor-intensive 
technology.  Or,  districts with dedicated taxes may employ higher-skilled and 
higher-quality workers.  Finally,  districts that use dedicated taxes could be 
in higher-wage areas.  To account for these factors, the analysis will control 
for prevailing wage rates and examine wages in districts producing a 
homogeneous output and employing homogeneous employees--bus drivers in local 
mass-transit systems. 
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The local mass-transit industry is the focus of the empirical 
analysis for several reasons.  First, the production processes involved are 
relatively homogeneous and their inputs  (labor hours and vehicle miles) are 
measurable,  facilitating comparisons of cost efficiency across transit 
providers.  Second, the employees of these systems are also relatively 
homogeneous.  In particular,  it is assumed that the human capital of bus 
drivers is similar across transit systems.  Finally, transit districts receive 
revenues from a wide variety of sources: fares,  federal operating assistance, 
state and federal capital grants, local general revenues,  and local dedicated 
taxes.  This heterogeneity permits control for variations in operating 
conditions and measurement of the impact of revenue sources and institutional 
settings on wage rates.  In particular,  I look for evidence of wage changes 
that are systematically related to the enactment of a local dedicated tax. 
Data  - 
The data source for this work is the Section 15 Reporting System 
administered by UMTA.  Section 15 of the Urban Mass Transportation Act  (UMT 
Act) establishes a uniform accounting system for public mass-transportation 
finances and operations.  All applicants and direct beneficiaries of federal 
assistance under Section 9 of the UMT Act are subject to this system and are 
required to file annual reports with UMTA. 
Section 15 data for fiscal year  (FY)  1979 through FY  1985 are 
available for some 435 transit systems and include detailed information on 
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revenue sources, expenses,  employees, and hours and miles of service provided. 
These data provide an extremely detailed view of a cross-section of local 
government entities that perform similar activities.  The revenue data are 
broken down into revenues from both transit operations and public subsidies, 
including information on federal,  state,  and local contributions for 
operations and capital procurement.  State and local revenues are broken down 
into those from dedicated taxes versus general revenues. 
The expense data include information on payroll, fringe benefits, 
materials, and services for the areas of administration,  operations,  and 
maintenance.  Data on labor hours for types of employees are provided as well. 
Using the expense and employee data, average hourly pay rates can be 
constructed for the different types of employees.  Operating statistics 
include data on passengers,  vehicle miles, and vehicle hours.  The detailed 
data on employee hours,  payroll, fringe benefits,  and local revenue sources 
are of particular interest for this work. 
Payroll and employee hour data were obtained for a homogeneous 
type of employee--bus  operators--for 165 public transit systems from 
1982-1985.  The sample was limited to systems that operated only bus service 
(as  opposed to subway,  commuter rail,  ferryboat, etc.),  that operated at least 
five vehicles,  that did not contract out senrice,  and that provided complete 
information for all years of the survey.5  These payroll and wage data were 
combined with revenue data to look for evidence of rent capture from dedicated 
taxes. 
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By the end of the sample period,  64 of the systems reported having 
local dedicated revenue sources to support their operations.  The UMTA data 
report the exact dollar value of monies spent from dedicated sources,  but 
provide little institutional information on the type of tax used.  For this 
research, I have supplemented the UMTA data through a telephone survey of the 
managers or staff of transit systems reporting dedicated revenues.  This 
information--the type of tax,  year the tax was enacted, and historical 
circumstances surrounding the tax enactment--is summarized in table 4. 
Property taxes were the most common type of tax observed  (28  of 64 
systems),  followed by gasoline excise (17),  sales (14), and payroll taxes  (5) 
California,  which accounts for 15 of the observed gasoline taxes, enacted a 
gasoline tax in 1972 that is administered by the state but returns money to 
the local level for transit based on the money collected in that area.  For 
the purposes of this study and for the UMTA statistics,  these funds are 
assumed to be local dedicated revenues.6  Eight of the dedicated taxes were 
enacted during the sample period and the other 56 during the 15-year period 
prior to 1982.  A majority were enacted between 1967 and 1973,  when federal 
capital assistance was being provided for the creation of publicly owned and 
operated transit systems.  Only five of the taxes observed required periodic 
voter approval, and none of the taxes was repealed during the sample period. 
A potentially serious objection to the analysis is that the presence 
of a dedicated tax is the result of high public-sector wages.  However, the 
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process by which most of these taxes were enacted renders this possibility 
tenuous at best. 
The historical circumstances surrounding the enactment of these 
taxes in the local mass-transit industry strongly suggest that funding 
policies at the state level were the major determinant of the existence of 
dedicated taxes for transit.  In the late 1960s and early 1970s,  the federal 
government provided capital assistance for the establishment of public transit 
systems subject to the provision of matching funds and operating assistance by 
state and local governments.  States with established subsidy programs for 
transportation  met the federal requirements from existing funding sources at 
the state level and from local general revenues.  Many states without existing 
funding sources,  however, encouraged the formation of special districts with 
taxing authority to meet the federal requirements.  Thus, most of the taxes 
observed in this period were established when the district was created. 
Transit systems in Pennsylvania--whose state government plays an 
activist role in mass transit--are barred by state law from enacting dedicated 
taxes.  In contrast, neighboring Ohio provides no state funding for mass 
transit but allows voter referenda to grant new local transit systems the 
authority to enact taxes. .Of  the sample of eight transit systems in Ohio, 
seven had dedicated taxes.  No local dedicated taxes exist in New York and 
Wisconsin,  both of which have extremely generous state programs for mass 
transit.  Rural-dominated siate legislatures in Texas,  Kansas,  Kentucky, 
Missouri,  Oregon,  and Washington,  however, provide authority for the use of 
local dedicated taxes because of their aversion to providing financial support 
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for inner-city bus service. (There  are reportedly also anti-union and racial 
motivations to some of these decisions, since most transit systems are 
unionized and a disproportionate number of riders are black.) 
Taxes enacted after 1974 typically were instituted after the transit 
system had been publicly owned and briefly supported by local general 
revenues.  Circumstances surrounding these taxes are varied,  but apparently 
the drain on local general revenues for operating assistance was larger than 
originally expected and new funding mechanisms were required.  This was 
especially true in areas desiring to expand their systems.  Groups supporting 
the expansion of transit and dedicated taxes in general included downtown 
business interests;  transit-dependent populations such as the poor, 
handicapped, and elderly; and transit unions. 
Finally,  small,  city-run systems in the South typically did not use 
dedicated taxes.  The service areas of these systems were historically covered 
by the bounds of the city government,  eliminating the need for a regional 
agency or specihl district.  States reporting such service were North 
Carolina,  Georgia, Alabama,  Tennessee,  and Mississippi. 
Preliminarv Em~irical  Evidence 
Sample means  (and  standard deviations) for system size, revenues, 
and vehicle operator wage rates in 1985 are reported in table 5.  The systems 
with dedicated taxes are,  on average,  three times as large as other systems, 
in terms of both miles of service delivered and number of vehicle operators. 
Revenues,  however,  are four times as large on average,  suggesting that systems 
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with dedicated taxes have larger budgets relative to service provided.  A 
breakdown of revenue composition implies that the use of dedicated taxes 
precludes the use of local general-revenue  sources.  Among the dedicated-tax 
systems,  earmarked revenues provide 40.4  percent of total funding,  while local 
general revenues account for 1.9 percent.  Systems without dedicated taxes, 
however,  receive 23.7 percent of their funding from local general revenues and 
only 0.1  percent from earmarked sources.8  Thus,  these two groups of transit 
systems exhibit extreme differences both in local funding mechanisms and in 
composition of revenues,  suggesting that comparison of wages and payroll 
between the two groups is a useful natural experiment. 
Average wages paid to vehicle operators were 16 percent higher in 
systems using dedicated taxes versus those without.  This finding provides 
only prima facie evidence of rent capture,  because several other explanations 
exist for this differential.  First,  dedicated-tax systems may have a higher 
rate of unionization than nondedicated-tax systems.  Second, operators in 
dedicated-tax  systems could be higher-quality,  more productive workers. 
Third, dedicated taxes may be more common in high-wage areas.  Finally,  there 
could be several unobservable fixed effects correlated with both high 
public-sector  wages and the use of dedicated taxes: for example,  strong 
public-sector unions, tastes for good or bad government,  and political 
structure. 
These concerns are addressed in turn below.  In the case of union 
status,  I  found that 81 percent of the nondedicated-tax systems were unionized 
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versus 97 percent of the dedicated-tax systems.  Union status can be 
controlled for through the standard use of a dummy variable.  No information 
is available,  however,  on the human capital of the public vehicle operators. 
I used the number of collisions and fatalities involving transit vehicles as 
measures of driver quality, but they had no significant explanatory value and 
do not affect the estimates presented here.  I am left to assume that the 
quality of bus drivers is homogeneous across transit systems. 
To measure regional variation in private-sector wage rates,  I ran a 
standard human-capital wage regression on the universe of private-sector 
workers in the Current Population Survey,  controlling for industry, 
occupation,  and 94  distinct geographic areas interacted with union status. 
The average human-capital measures for motor vehicle operators were then used 
with these results to project a union and nonunion wage rate for vehicle 
+
 
operators in each geographic area.  This procedure was repeated for each of 
the four years in the sample period.  These estimated private-sector wages 
were then used as independent explanatory variables for vehicle operator wages 
in public transit systems. 
Sample means for the private-sector wages and other demographic 
variables are reported in.table  6.  Wages average 4.6 percent higher for 
nonunion, private vehicle operators in areas using dedicated taxes versus 
those without, explaining part of the differential observed in public wages 
The areas using dedicated taxes also have higher populations,  density, 
incomes,  and population growth.  Areas without dedicated taxes have higher 
poverty rates and a higher percentage of black population,  reflecting the use 
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of city financing in the South.  No significant difference is observed in 
transit demand in these areas as measured by the percentage of people who 
drive to work versus take mass transit. 
In general,  -the  sample means suggest that wages are higher among 
transit systems that use dedicated tax rates.  Vehicle operators in the 
dedicated tax systems receive,  on average,  a 12.3 percent,  or $1.07 per hour, 
premium above the private-sector wage for nonunion drivers.  Operators in 
systems without dedicated taxes receive a premium of only 1.2 percent, or 
$0.10 per hour.  These statistics,  of course,  do not systematically control 
for demographic variables,  unionization,  economies of scale, and other 
observable variables influencing wage rates.  Finally,  as already discussed, a 
series of possible unobservable fixed effects associated with dedicated taxes 
and public-sector wages are also not controlled.  The empirical analysis of 
the next section takes into account both these observable independent 
variables and unobservable fixed effects in order to test the robustness of 
this evidence of rent capture. 
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IV.  Payroll and Wane Chan~es  after Tax Enactment 
While the sample period in this study is only four years,  the 
dedicated taxes were enacted over a 17-year period.  I exploit this variation 
in the age of taxes in order to make inferences regarding the time path of 
payroll,  wages,  and revenue following tax enactment.  To this end,  I construct 
a variable called YEAR that equals the number of years that have passed since 
a tax was first enacted. The values of YEAR for a system with a tax enacted in 
1980,  for example,  are 2,  3,  4,  and 5 for the 1982-1985 sample period years, 
respectively. 
Table 7  reports the sample means  (and  standard deviations) for 
payroll,  public operator wage,  private nonunion operator wage,  and system 
size.  The means for systems without dedicated taxes are broken down by union 
status.  For dedicated-tax systems,  the means are broken down by the values of 
YEAR observed during the four-year sample period.  There are 404 time-series 
cross-section  observations for the nondedicated-tax  systems,  and 256 such 
observations for the dedicated-tax systems.  Values are reported in 1985 
dollars.  Caution is needed in interpreting these results, as individual 
dedicated-tax systems appear in four different year groups,  introducing 
correlation among the sample values. 
The sample means do not suggest that dedicated taxes are enacted in 
predominantly high-wage areas or in systems that already have high wages.  The 
average public wage in the pre-tax observations is $7.97 per hour versus an 
average $8.59 per hour for the unionized nondedicated-tax systems.  Compared 
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with the private-sector wages,  these wages represent $0.20 and $0.55 premiums, 
respectively, suggesting that unions in the systems initially without 
dedicated taxes were not doing as well as their peers.  In the year following 
tax enactment,  however,  the means suggest that public-sector wages jump to 
$9.17 per hour,  a $1.13 premium,  and peak at $10.55 per hour by year 4,  a 
$2.34 premium.  While the wages and premiums vary in the ensuing years,  they 
remain above the average for the unionized nondedicated average and are above 
$9.00 in all years but 7 and those over 16.  Examination of payroll per mile 
of service shows a 34-percent jump following the enactment of the dedicated 
tax. 
In general,  these sample means provide further evidence that 
enactment of a dedicated tax leads to rent capture by the vehicle operators 
Whether measured in payroll or wages,  labor costs rise substantially in the 
years immediately following the enactment of the tax and remain above the 
labor costs existing in systems without dedicated taxes over time.  These 
statistics,  of course,  do not systematically control for demographic 
variables, unionization, economies of scale,  private-sector wages,  and other 
observable variables influencing wage rates. 
The econometric analysis uses pooled cross-section  regressions with 
vehicle operator payroll and wage rates as dependent variables.  Wage rates 
are a commonly used measure of union success in delivering rents to workers, 
but are probably not the best measure in this study for two reasons. First, 
payroll measures reflect both wage rates and a union's ability to expand 
membership.  Thus,  comparing payroll changes with revenue changes stemming 
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from a new tax provides a more complete measure of rent capture.  Second, the 
wage rates used below were constructed from the payroll data and data on 
employee labor hours.  While the payroll data come from balance sheets and are 
reportedly accurate, labor hours are more poorly measured,  potentially 
introducing error into the wage measures.  For these reasons, the discussion 
will focus principally on the payroll estimates,  although the wage regressions 
are also reported and deliver qualitatively similar results. 
The basic equation for estimation,  shown in equation (I), uses 
the log of public operators' payroll  (wage)  as the dependent variable as 
follows  : 
Time-variant explanatory variables include the log of miles of service 
provided  (LSIZE),  the log of the private-sector nonunion wage  (LPRIWAGE),  and 
sample-year dummies (DUM83,  DUM84,  DUM85).  The impact of a dedicated tax is 
measured by the dollar amount of dedicated revenues collected per mile 
(DEDREV),  DEDREV-squared,  and a length j  vector of YEARj  dummies, j=1,  ...,  17, 
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measuring time since tax enactment. YEAR5 equals one,  for example,  when 
YEAR=5.  The YEARj and DEDREV variables are set to zero for systems with no 
dedicated taxes.  Finally, the specification includes a vector of six 
variables measuring union status and area demographics,  which were not 
observed to change over the sample period.  (In  the case of the demographic 
variables,  this was due to data limitations.)  The variables collected for 
each system area were union status, log of population, log of population 
density,  percent change in population between 1980 and 1984,  percent of black 
population, log of per capita income,  and the poverty rate.  9 
Two procedures are used.  The first is a generalized least squares 
(GLS)  procedure that controls for cross-section  heteroscedasticity and 
time-wise first-order correlation of errors as discussed in Kmenta  (1986).  In 
the absence of correlated fixed effects,  this procedure is efficient. If fixed 
effects are present and correlated with the independent variables,  however, 
the GLS estimates are inconsistent.  The second procedure used is the standard 
fixed-effects  (FE)  or "within-group" estimator discussed in Hausman and Taylor 
(1981).  The cross-section observations are differenced from their individual 
means,  and ordinary least squares  (OLS)  is run on the transformed data.  All 
time-invariant variables are eliminated.  In the absence of correlated fixed 
effects,  the FE estimator is consistent but inefficient. If fixed effects are 
present,  however,  the FE estimator still yields consistent results.  Hausman 
specification  tests are then conducted to test the null hypothesis of no 
correlated fixed effects. 
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Results for the GLS payroll regressions are reported in table 8a. 
In equation (I),  which omits the dedicated tax variables,  LSIZE has an 
estimated coefficient  (standard  error) of 0.981 (0.014), suggesting that 
payroll has a scale elasticity of nearly one.  LPRIWAGE has an estimated 
coefficient of 0.455 (0.086), showing that nearly half of the variation in 
private-sector wages is reflected in the public-sector payroll wage.  When the 
demographic variables are omitted  (not  shown here),  the private wage 
coefficient is 0.578  (0.091).  While my prior expectation was a relation 
closer to one,  restricting the coefficient to one did not substantially affect 
the results that follow.  Standard errors increased,  but the estimated 
coefficients changed little and were still significant.  10 
The estimated coefficient for the union dummy is 0.325 (0.28), 
suggesting that unions raise payrolls by 38 percent.  This is a large effect 
compared to most estimates of private and public union wage premiums.  It 
reflects in part the use of low-wage,  part-time operators by nonunion systems 
and,  to the extent that the size and private wage variables are not perfect 
controls,  the small size of these systems and their concentration in low-wage 
areas of the South.  It also implies,  however, that transit unions are in 
general successful in capturing rents for their members.  Finally,  the time 
dummies show an upward trend in wage rates and,  among the demographic 
variables,  population and density have positive and significant effects on 
payroll,  while percent black, poverty, and income have negative effects. 
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payroll by entering the level of dedicated revenues per mile,  DEDREV, and 
DEDREV-squared into the specification.  The estimated coefficient for DEDREV 
is 0.0640  and is statistically significant at the 99-percent confidence level 
with a t-statistic of 4.64.  The estimated coefficient  (standard  error) for 
DEDREV-squared is  -0.0023  (0.0026).  Evaluated at the average value of DEDREV 
for dedicated-tax systems in 1985  ($1.33  per mile),  these estimates suggest 
that use of a dedicated tax increases operator payrolls by 8.4  percent. 
Equation  (3)  of the table omits the level variables but includes the 
YEAR dummies in order to explore the time path of payroll following tax 
enactment.  Payroll is significantly higher in YEAR3,  YEAR4,  and YEARS,  with 
estimated coefficients of 0.082,  0.100,  and 0.084,  respectively.  The 
estimated effect diminishes in YEAR6 and YEAR7  (where  there are few 
observations),  but returns to the 0.07 to 0.10 range for the following years 
and remains statistically significant through YEAR15.  These estimates suggest 
that payroll rises 7 to 10 percent in the years immediately following a tax 
enactment and that these gains are relatively stable over time. 
Equation  (4)  of table 8a  controls for both the level of revenues and 
the time path.  The estimated coefficients for the level variables change 
little from equation (2),  and the estimate for DEDREV remains statistically 
significant with a t-statistic of 2.90.  The YEAR dummies,  however, no longer 
reveal a significant change in payroll over time.  This result changes in the 
fixed-effects  (FE)  estimates,  which I will now discuss. 
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Fixed-Effects Estimation Results 
Results from the FE estimation are reported in table 8b,  with 
equations  (5)  through  (8)  corresponding to equations  (1)  through (4) of the 
GLS  estimates.  Equation  (5)  again omits all dedicated-tax variables.  The 
estimated coefficient  (standard  error) of the size variable is 0.711  (0.026). 
This is below the GLS  estimates and suggests that economies of scale with 
respect to labor costs exist within transit systems.  The private-sector wage 
variables and the time dummies,  however,  change little from the GLS  estimates, 
and the time-invariant demographic and union variables,  of course,  are 
omitted. 
The FE results for the dedicated-tax  variables remain 
statistically significant and increase in magnitude from the GLS  estimates. 
The estimated coefficient on DEDREV in equation (6), which omits the year 
dummies, is 0.0947 and has a t-statistic of 4.53.  This suggests that the 
average dedicated tax of $1.33 per mile raises payroll by 12.1 percent.  When 
the YEAR dummies are included instead of the level variables,  however, 
allowing for payroll growth over time, the estimated increase is much larger 
As reported in equation (7), payroll grows by 22 percent in the four-year 
period following tax enactment,  remains 20 to 23 percent higher through year 
7,  then increases to a 33 .to  39 percent higher level in years 9 through 15, 
before falling off in years 16 and beyond. 
Equation  (8)  includes both the DEDREV variables and YEAR dummies. 
The estimated coefficient for DEDREV is 0.0607,  which is little changed from 
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the GLS  estimates,  and has a t-statistic of 2.28.  The YEAR dummies,  however, 
in contrast to the GLS  results,  are statistically significant and reveal 
growth in payroll in the early years of the dedicated tax.  For the average 
dedicated tax, the results suggest that payroll grows by 21 percent during the 
first four years following tax enactment, then reaches a 30-  to 34-percent 
higher level in years 10 through 15. 
Note that the FE estimates of the long-term impact of a tax rely on 
observed payroll changes occurring within individual systems during the 
four-year sample period.  Because taxes were enacted at different times,  an 
estimate of the cumulative impact of a tax lasting J years is feasible.  The 
FE estimate for a tax lasting J years links together payroll changes observed 
in individual systems with taxes of age 1 through J.  For higher values of J, 
therefore,  the standard error of the total estimated change grows.  This 
increasing imprecision is seen in the steady growth of standard errors of the 
FE estimates of the YEARj coefficients for higher values of YEAR.  Indeed,  for 
J > 15,  the estimated payroll change is not statistically significant, 
although the point estimate is still large.  Greater confidence can thus be 
placed in the projections for the early years of a dedicated tax, particularly 
those immediately following tax enactment. 
S~ecification  Tests 
In the absence of correlated fixed effects, the GLS estimates are 
efficient,  while the FE estimates are inefficient but consistent.  If 
correlated fixed effects are present, however,  the GLS estimates are 
inconsistent,  while the FE estimates remain consistent.  Hausman  (1978)  shows 
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Under the null hypothesis of no correlated fixed effects, the difference in 
the estimated P's, PFE  -  BGLS,  should be small relative to the difference 
in the covariance matrix of the estimates,  VFE  -  VGLS. The Hausman 
test-statistic M,  shown in equation  (2)  below, is distributed x2  under 
q 
H,,  where q is the number of potentially biased coefficients tested. 
Hausman tests of the GLS  specifications  (1)  through  (4)--FE 
specifications  (5)  through  (8)--reject  the null hypothesis of no correlated 
fixed effects at the 99.5-percent  confidence level.  The test statistics 
(critical  values) are 125.2 (16.8), 131.0 (20.3), 49.8 (44.2), and 156.4 
(46.8), respectively.  The GLS  results reveal a similar pattern of the effect 
of dedicated taxes,  but of lower magnitude.  Unobserved fixed effects appear 
to bias downward the estimated change in payroll that follows a tax enactment. 
- 
Wage Regression Results  . 
Using wage rates as a dependent variable instead of payroll yields 
qualitatively similar results.  The GLS  regressions,  reported in table 9a, 
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show that including the DEDREV variables alone  (equation (10))  results in an 
estimated coefficient  (standard  error) of 0.0598  (0.0119) for DEDREV and 
-0.0074  (0.0026)  for DEDREV-squared,  representing 6.8 percent higher wages for 
the average dedicated tax.  The significant negative coefficient on 
DEDREV-squared suggests a decreasing ability to raise wages for higher revenue 
levels.  Including the YEARj dummies alone  (equation (11))  indicates a 
statistically significant 8.4 percent rise in wages from an initial level of 
$8.23 to $8.92 by year 2 of the tax.  Wages remain in the $8.85 to $9.23 range 
between years 4  and 11,  then decline tp $8.69 in year 14.  The higher levels 
are statistically significant throughout this period.  Including both the 
DEDREV and YEARj variables  (equation  (12))  indicates that wages rise 
significantly with the level of dedicated revenues and also have significantly 
higher levels in years 4,  6,  and 8 through 11,  suggesting an upward time path 
after tax enactment. 
The FE estimates for wages are reported in table 9b.  Contrary to 
the GLS and payroll results, a statistically significant increase stemming 
from dedicated revenue levels  (equations (14)  and  (16))  is no longer 
indicated.  The YEARj  dummies  (equations (15)  and (16)),  however, show a 
statistically significant rise in wages following tax enactment.  The increase 
is on the same order of magnitude and follows a similar pattern to the payroll 
FE estimates.  As shown in figure 1,  wages rise from an initial base of $8.23 
to $10.00 by year 6 and remain at this level through year 12 before declining 
slightly.  The higher wages are statistically significant in year 2 and in 
years 4  through 13.  As with the payroll FE results, the 95-percent confidence 
interval surrounding the estimate grows with higher values of YEAR.  In spite 
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follows closely the wage rates observed in the sample means, raising 
confidence in the robustness of the results. 
Hausman specification tests reject the null hypothesis of no 
correlated fixed effects at the 99.5-percent  confidence level for GLS 
specification  (9)  and at the 95-percent confidence level for specifications 
(10)  and  (12)--corresponding  to equations (13),  (14), and  (16)  of the FE 
results.  The test statistics  (critical  values) are 24.6 (16.8), 17.9 (14.1), 
and 39.2 (37.7), respectively.  GLS specification 11,  however,  is not 
rejected.  The test statistic is 1.2,  versus a 95-percent critical value of 
33.9. (The  test statistic of this specification in the payroll regression 
showed a similar drop,  but still rejected.)  Given the overwhelming rejection 
of the GLS specification in all of the payroll regressions and in three out of 
four wage regressions,  I use FE estimates in the next section to simulate the 
impact of a dedicated tax on system size,  revenues,  and the payroll share of 
revenues. 
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To explore the implications of a dedicated tax for system size and 
revenues,  I ran FE regressions using LSIZE and the log of revenues,  LREV,  as 
dependent variables,  and the YEARj and other time-varying variables as 
independent variables.  These results are reported in table 10 in equations 
(17)  and (18), respectively.  For comparative purposes and for the convenience 
of the reader,  I also report in equation  (19)  the FE payroll estimate from 
equation  (8).  Finally,  I use the payroll share of revenues  (measured  as LPAY 
-  LREV) as a dependent variable to directly estimate changes in the labor 
claim on revenues.  These results form the basis for the simulation exercises 
that follow.  As with the other FE estimates,  the standard errors grow for 
higher values of YEAR; therefore, the focus of the discussion will be 
principally on the years immediately following the enactment of a dedicated 
tax. 
Equation  (17)  indicates that systems that enact a dedicated tax 
undergo a significant and large expansion in the six-year period following a 
tax enactment.  As shown in figure 2,  the simulation suggests that the average 
system grows 40 percent by year 3 and reaches a 45-  to 52-percent  higher level 
by year 6,  at which point it stabilizes.  Such a large expansion is consistent 
with the reports I  received from transit managers who just recently enacted 
taxes.  The taxes are often presented to the voters as an opportunity to 
increase service significantly.  This large expansion in size naturally 
corresponds with higher revenues and payroll.  I therefore conduct simulations 
allowing both for system expansion and for keeping the size of a system 
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results from equation  (17).  As in the previous section, the base values for 
the simulations are the mean  (log)  values for systems without dedicated taxes 
The change in revenues that follows the enactment of a dedicated 
tax is estimated in equation  (18)  in table 10.  Total revenues from all 
sources,  as opposed to only dedicated tax revenues, is used as the dependent 
variable for several reasons.  While I know the exact amount of total revenues 
spent and the percentage of those revenues from local dedicated taxes, the 
total amount collected from a dedicated tax is not reported.  Some dedicated 
tax revenues may be stored in trust funds for use in expansions or in future 
years,  especially in the early years of the tax.  Furthermore,  while I know 
the tax rates in most cases,  I have no information on the size of the tax 
base, preventing direct measurement of its change or erosion over time. 
Finally,  enactment of a dedicated tax usually coincides with a substitution 
away from other revenue sources--principally  local general revenues,  though 
sometimes fares are reduced as well.  Because labor is concerned with its 
share of the total pie,  examining labor's share in the change of total 
revenues is a natural measurement of rent capture. 
Coinciding with the expansion in size,  revenue estimates show a 
dramatic rise in the years immediately following tax enactment.  (To  simulate 
the change in revenues, I sum the increase resulting from the YEARj dummies 
'  with the increase implied by the assumed expansion path and the estimated 
LSIZE coefficient.)  As shown in figure 3,  revenues jump a statistically 
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significant 40 percent during the first year of the tax,  and remain at a 35- 
to 45-percent higher level through year 14 before declining in the last few 
years.  A similar projection for payroll,  from the estimates in equation (19), 
is shown in figure 4.  Payroll rises 50 percent by year 4,  then increases to a 
60-  to 80-percent higher level in years 8 through 14.  The increase is 
statistically significant throughout the projection period.  To compare the 
payroll and revenue increases, figure 5 charts the dollar amount of changes 
occurring in both on the same scale.  Following tax enactment,  payroll takes 
up a steadily increasing percentage of the additional revenues, absorbing 27 
percent by year 3,  47 percent by year 9,  and all additional revenues by the 
end of the projection period. 
To net out the direct effects on revenues and payroll resulting 
from system expansion,  or possible economies of scale, I also project revenues 
and payroll while holding system size constant.  Figure 6 shows that the 
dedicated tax results in significantly higher revenues of 17 to 29 percent in 
years 1 through 4.  In the years immediately following a tax increase, the 
system thus has much higher funding relative to the level of service provided 
prior to the dedicated tax.  This increase can thus be viewed as a measure of 
"excess" revenues, which are a potential target for capture by labor unions. 
A  similar projection for payroll,  shown in figure 7,  suggests a 
steady and permanent increase following tax enaction.  Payroll  'rises to a 28- 
to 39-percent higher level by year 10,  and the higher level is statistically 
significant throughout the projection period.  As shown in figure 8,  the 
change in payroll appears to absorb all excess revenues by year 
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excess revenues by year 14.  Note that the point estimate of payroll edges 
down once excess revenues disappear.  In general,  these results show that all 
additional revenues are absorbed in payroll by year 6 of the tax,  and that 
these gains are permanent in spite of the gradual disappearance of additional 
revenues resulting from the tax. 
Finally,  equation  (20)  in table 10 reports the direct impact of 
a tax on the payroll share of revenues.  As shown in figure 9,  payroll share 
takes an initial drop from 28.7 percent to  25 percent,  corresponding with the 
initial surge in revenues.  By year 6,  however, payroll share rises to  33 
percent, a statistically significant higher level, and steadily increases to 
38  percent by year 15.  Enactment of a dedicated tax thus appears to result in 
a steady increase in the labor share of revenues.  It should be noted that the 
payroll share estimates fall well within the range observed in the raw data. 
In sum, these results strongly suggest that the use of a 
dedicated tax system provides significant opportunities for rent capture by 
public-sector  unions.  Controlling for private-sector wages and system size, 
statistically significant growth is seen in wages, payroll, and the labor 
share of revenues.  Within six years, the simulations suggest that higher 
payroll absorbs all additional revenues resulting from a dedicated tax. The 
payroll share of revenues continues to increase throughout the sample period, 
in spite of a fall in revenues. 
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This paper provides a direct test of whether the enactment of a 
dedicated tax leads to rent capture by public employees.  In a natural 
experiment provided by the wide variation in funding arrangements for local 
mass-transit systems,  the empirical analysis reveals a systematic link between 
changes in the wages and payroll for a homogeneous type of employee--bus 
operators--and enactment of a dedicated tax.  The results are robust across 
several specifications, and the simulation values of wages,  payroll,  revenues, 
and payroll shares from a hypothetical tax are well within the observed range 
of values. 
Sample means show that hourly wage rates for public-sector 
operators rise from a pre-tax level of $7.97 to more than $10.00 in the 
two-year period following a tax enactment,  and over time remain substantially 
above the average of $8.59 per hour for unionized systems with no dedicated 
taxes.  Pooled time-series cross-section  regressions are used to control for 
local private-sector wage rates,  system size,  unionization,  and demographic 
characteristics.  A generalized least squares  (GLS)  procedure is initially 
used and suggests that significant wage and payroll gains of 8 to 10 percent 
follow a tax enactment. 
Although it is possible that the existence of a dedicated tax 
results from high local wages,  history strongly suggests that the principal 
determinant for the existence of dedicated taxes for transit are state-level 
policies.  The more plausible channel for bias is the presence of unobserved 
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fixed effects that are correlated with both public-sector  wages and the 
existence of dedicated taxes.  This potential bias is explicitly tested and 
controlled for with the standard fixed-effects  (FE)  estimator,  which reveals a 
statistically significant increase in labor costs of greater magnitude than 
the GLS estimates.  Payroll and wages rise 20 percent in the six years 
following the tax enactment,  and this increase remains stable over time. 
Hausman specification tests strongly reject the null hypothesis of no 
correlated fixed effects. 
The FE results are used in simulations that measure the extent to 
which the payroll increases represent the capture of additional revenues 
resulting from a dedicated tax.  The results suggest that in the period 
immediately following the enactment of a dedicated tax, transit systems expand 
significantly in size,  revenues, and payroll.  Holding system size constant, 
the results show that payroll absorbs all additional revenues by year 6 of the 
tax.  The payroll share of total revenues takes an initial drop with the surge 
of new revenues,  but as payroll and wages steadily increase, the payroll share 
rises from 27 percent at year 1 to almost 40 percent at the end of the 17-year 
projection period. 
The results,  suggest that enactment of a dedicated tax leads to 
significant rent capture by public-sector unions in the local mass-transit 
industry.  They support the argument that traditional budgeting methods that 
weigh the costs and benefits of competing uses of funds act as a check on 
public employee power.  Thus, efficiencies that result from earmarked funding 
may be offset by increased labor costs. 
http://clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfm
Best available copyThese results should be treated with some caution,  however,  for 
the following reasons.  First,  the simulation of payroll and revenues for a 
hypothetical tax lasting up to 17 years was estimated from only a four-year 
sample period.  Future work will entail collecting wage and payroll data prior 
to 1982 to see if the wage gains observed in the sample period also occurred 
in earlier years.  Second,  while the assumption that bus drivers are 
homogeneous seems reasonable,  I have no direct measures of human capital with 
which to test this assumption.  Changes in the quality and composition of 
employees,  however,  are reported to occur in the administrative area following 
a tax enactment.  Systems with dedicated taxes appear to hire highly paid 
managers and additional planning, marketing,  and public relations personnel. 
(The  general manager of Bi-State Transit in St. Louis is reportedly the 
highest-paid public employee in Missouri, with the exception of the governor.) 
One possible approach in future work will be to examine whether changes in the 
composition of administrative staff result in higher-quality service or 
cost-effectiveness. 
In general, the evidence of rent capture appears to be robust for 
the local mass-transit industry and confirms differences in wages and salary 
share of revenues observed in the aggregate data on the use of dedicated'taxes 
in special districts.  While the local mass-transit industry provides a clean 
experiment due to its homogeneous output, inputs, and production processes, 
examination of districts producing other types of outputs would provide 
additional confirmation.  Also of interest would be examination of dedicated 
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taxes at the state and federal levels.  Examination of the impact of 
earmarking for education at the state level is a possible avenue for future 
research. 
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1. For an extreme example of political empire-building resulting from a 
dedicated revenue source,  see the Caro  (1984)  account of Robert Moses and the 
toll revenues of the Tri-borough Bridge Commission in New York. 
2. For a general discussion of earmarking,  see Gold,  et. al.  (1987) 
3. For for a general discussion of economic rents and regulation,  see Joskow 
and Rose  (forthcoming).  Studies of airline deregulation include Card  (1986). 
4.  None of the dedicated taxes observed in this study was repealed during the 
four-year sample period. 
5.  Thirteen systems that provided data that were obviously "wrong" or 
inconsistent over time were also omitted.  For example,  one system reported 
having no expenses for fuel or tires.  Others reported having no operating 
employees.  Still others reported large swings in the size of operations and 
revenues.  In general,  the payroll,  revenue,  and operating data such as 
mileage are of high quality, while the data on employee hours and passengers 
is less so. 
6.  Omitting California from the sample results in larger standard errors but 
does not substantively change the results. 
7. Wisconsin subsidizes operating expenses at a 36-percent matching rate. 
8. Certain systems without dedicated taxes receive trace amounts of revenues 
earmarked from local sources such as parking meter fees,  license fees,  and 
other local charges. 
9.  Demographic variables were collected from the U.S.  Census Bureau  (1986). 
10. Other specifications tested included those entering crashes,  fatalities, 
and the private-sector union wage.  Coefficients on these variables were 
insignificant and did not affect the results. 
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Best available copyTable 1 
Trends in Special Districts: 
Number of Units and Revenue Composition 
--  - 
Number of units  14,405  21,264  25,987  28,719 
Percent of total  14.1  26.2  32.5  34.9 
governmental units  \ 
Revenue~  * 
(1982  $,  millions) 
Total  6.280  11.838  21.795  30.961 
Federal aid  315  763  3,723  4,405 
State aid  140  475  1,274  1,810 
Local general  119  747  1,555  2,057 
revenues 
Local dedicated  1,213  1,841  2,597  2,846 
taxes 




Total  -  -  100  -  100  -  100  -  100 
Federal aid  5.0  6.4  17.1  14.2 
State aid  2.2  4.0  5.8  5.8 
Local general  1.9  6.3  7.1  6.6 
revenues 
Local dedicated  19.3  15.5  11.9  9.2 
taxes 
Own source  71.5  67.7  58  .O  64.1 
revenues 
* Calculated with GNP deflator for state and local purchases. 
Sources: U.S.  Census Bureau,  Census of Governments, and author's  calculations. 
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Best available copyTable  2 
The  Use  of  Dedicated Taxe,s: 
Special District Revenues  and Wages 
Districts  Districts 
Census  With  Dedicated  Without  Dedicated 
Year  Tax  Authority  Tax  Authority 
Total revenues  *  1967  5,371  6,466 
(1982  $,  millions) 




Wage  and  salary  1967 
share of  revenues 
(percent)  1972 
* Calculated with GNP  deflator for state and  local purchases 
Sources:  U.S.  Census  Bureau,  Census  of  Governments,  and  author's calculations. 
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Best available copyTable 3 
Composition of 1982 
Special District Revenues  (Percent): 
States Rank-Ordered by Use of Local Dedicated Taxes 
---Local---- 
Federal  State  Gen.  Ded  .  Own  Wage and 
Quintile  Total  Aid  Aid  Rev.  Taxes  Source  Salary Share 
National  100  14.2  5.8  6.6  9.2  64.1  25.2 
averape 
* Unweighted averages,  Hawaii excluded. Quintile 3 has 9 states. 
Sources:  U.S. Census Bureau,  1982 Census of Governments,  and author's 
calculations. 
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Best available copyTable 4 
Dedicated Taxes for Local Mass-Transit Systems 
Year 
Enacted  State  System Name 
Type  Periodic 
of Tax  Renewal ? 
Ft. Lauderdale-Browrd Cnty TA gasoline 
Waterloo-Black Hawk Cnty TA  property 
Austin TA  sales 
Fort Worth CITRAN  sales 
Gainesville-RTS  gasoline 
Hillborough Area RTA  sales 
Parkrsbrg-Mid-Ohio Valley TA  property 
Huntington-Tri-State  TA  property 
Lansing-Capital Area TA  property 
Columbus-Central Ohio TA  sales 
Spokane TA  sales 
no 
no 
yes  (3  year) 
no 
yes  (5  year) 
no 
1980  WA  Tacoma-Pierce Cnty TS  sales  no 
1978  KY  Ft. Wright-TA No. Kentucky  payroll  no 
TX  San Antonio-VIA Metro Tr.  sales  no 
TX  Houston-MTA  sales  no 
WV  Wheeling-Ohio Valley RTA  property  no 
1976  I  A  Sioux City TS  property  no 
S Daytona-E Volusia TA 
-Indianapolis PTC 
Denver-RTD 
Louisville-TA  River City 
Pinellas Suncoast TA 
City of Dubuque-Keyline TS 
Gary PTC 
Topeka MTA 
Ypsilanti-Ann  Arbor TA 
St. Louis-Bi-State  TA 
Cincinnati-SORTA 
Portland-Tri-County MTD 
Eugene-Lane County MTD 
Charlestn-Kanawha Vly RTA 
C  A  Sacramento RTD 
C  A  Los Angeles-SCRTD 
C  A  Monterey-Salinas TA 
























yes  (5  year) 
gasoline  no 
gasoline  no 
gasoline  no 
gasoline  no 
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Dedicated Taxes for Local Mass-Transit Systems 
Year 
Enacted  state  System Name 
Type  Periodic 
of Tax  Renewal ? 
1972  C  A 
(cont .)  CA 
C  A 
C  A 
C  A 
C  A 
C  A 
C  A 
C  A 
C  A 
C  A 
NE 
OH 
Santa Monica Muni Bus 
San Diego TS 
Alameda-Contra Costa TD 
Oxnard-S Coast Area Transit 
Gardena-Municipal  Bus 
Santa Barbara MTD 
Fresno TS 
Stockton MTD 
Bakrsfld-Golden  Empire TD 
Riverside TA 
N San Diego TS 
TA of Omaha 
Akron-Metropolitan  RTA 
I  L  Champaign-Urbana  MTD 
I  L  Rock Island County MTD 
I  L  Greater Peoria Mass TD 
IN  Greater Lafayette PTC 
MO  Kansas City Area TA 
OH  Canton RTA 
OH  Youngstown-Western  Res. 
MN  Minneapolis MTC 
MN  Duluth TA 
OH  Toledo RTA 
UT  Salt Lake City-Utah TA 
1968  IL  Springfield MTD 
IN  Fort Wayne PTC 
1967  I  A  Cedar Rapids Bus Dept. 
IN  South Bend PTC 



































yes  (5  year) 
yes (10  year) 
Source: Telephone survey by.author. 
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Best available copyTable 5 
Transit System Summary Statistics: 
Size,  Revenues,  Wages 
Systems With  Systems Without 















Local dedicated  40.4 
taxes  (16.3) 
Own source 
(fares) 
Unionized  63/65  82/101 
Wages 
($  per hour) 
* 1985 sample means  (standard  deviations). 
Sources: UMTA  (1985) and author's calculations. 
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Best available copyTable 6  *  Private-Sector Wages and Demographic Variables 
I 
Areas With  Areas With 
Systems Using  Systems Not Using 







Density  531.8 
(pop.  per sq. mi.)  (567.3) 
Pop. growth  14.4 
(%  change,  1980-84)  (74.9) 
Income 
($  per capita) 
Poverty 
(%  of pop.) 
Black 
(%  of POP.) 
Drive to work 
(%  of POP.) 
Bus to work 
(%  of pop.) 
* 1985 sample means  (standard  deviations). 
Sources  :  U.  S  . Census ~ureau'  (1986)  and author  '  s calculations. 
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Systems  with 
dedicated taxes 
Pre  - tax 
Years  after 
tax enactment 
Table  7 
Trends  After Tax  Enactme~t: 
Payroll, Wages,  and  Size 
Vehicle Operator 
Wages  ($ per hr.)  System 
Number,gf  Payroll  ----------------  Size 
Obs .  ($  per mi.)  Public  Private  (000  mi.) 
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Best available copyTable 7 (cont.) 
Trends after Tax Enactmen$: 
Payroll,  Wages,  and Size 
Vehicle Operator 
Wages ($ per hr.)  System 
Years after  Number,gf  Payroll  ----------------  Size 
tax enactment  Obs  .  ($  per mi.)  Public  Private  (000  mi.) 
Y  EAR-1  5 
YEAR= 1  6 
YEAR > 16 
* Means  (standard  deviations).  All $  figures are in 1985 values,  calculated 
using the Consumer Price Index. 
** Time-series/cross-sectional observations: 165 transit systems were observed 
over a 4-year  (1982-85)  period for a total of 660 observations. 
Source: Author's  calculations. 
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Generalized Least Squares Payroll Regressions 




(log  miles) 
LPRIWAGE 
(log  private wage) 
DEDREV 




Best available copyIndependent 
Variables 
Table 8a (cont.)  * 
Generalized Least Squares Payroll Regressions 
Dependent Variable: Log of Operators' Payroll 
YEAR17 
(-1  if YEAR > 16) 
Transit union 





%  change in 
population, 80 
Black 
(%  of pop) 
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Best available copyTable 8a (cont.)  * 
Generalized Least Squares Payroll Regressions 
Dependent Variable: Log of Operators' Payroll 
Independent 
Variables  (1)  (2  (3)  (4) 
Income  -0.198  -0.162  -0.208  -0.181 
(per  capita, log)  (0.047)  (0.047)  (0.051)  (0.049) 
Poverty  -0.00008  -0.00009  -0.00009  0.00009 
(%  of pop.)  (0.00004)  (0.00004)  (0.00004) (0.00004) 
Constant 
Buse R-squared  0.983  0.976  0.980  0.974 
Mean dep. var.  7.219  7.219  7.219  2.093 
Log likelihood  627.07  636.70  634.10  680.666 
Estimated rho  0.823  0.825  0.817  0.767 
* Estimated coefficients  (standard  errors).  GLS prodedure used on 
cross-sectionally heteroscedastic and time-wise autoregressive model discussed 
in Kmenta  (1986).  Cross-sections  restricted to have same autoregressive 
parameter.  Buse R-Squared defined in Buse  (1973). 
Source: Author's calculations. 
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Fixed-Effects  Payroll Regressions 
Dependent Variable:  Log  of Operators'  Payroll 
Independent 
Variable  (5)  (6  (7)  (8) 
LSIZE 
(log miles) 
LPRIWAGE  0.435  0.436  0.367  0.362 
(log private wage)  (0.141)  (0.137)  (0.142)  (0.141) 
DEDREV 
($  per mile) 
Years  after 
tax enactment 
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Best available copyTable 8b (cont.)  * 
Fixed-Effects Payroll Regressions 
Dependent Variable: Log of Operators' Payroll 
Independent 
Variable 
YEAR17  ---  ---  0.210  0.068 
(-1  if YEAR > 16)  ---  - - -  (0.111)  (0.125) 
................................................................ 
R-squared  0.673  0.690  0.693  0.699 
Mean dep. var.  7.219  7.219  7.219  7.219 
Log likelihood  806.96  824.51  828.07  834.78 
Hausman test stat.  125.2  131.0  49.8  156.4 
* Estimated coefficients  (standard  errors). 
Source: Author's  calculations. 
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Best available copyIndependent 
Variables 
Table 9a  * 
Generalized Least Squares Wage Regressions 
Dependent Variable: Log of Operators' Wage 
LSIZE 
(log  miles) 
LPRIWAGE  0.237  0.134  0.126  0.117 
(log  private wage)  (0.069)  (0.070)  (0.078)  (0.078) 
DEDREV 




Best available copyTable 9a (cont.)  * 
Generalized Least Squares Wage Regressions 
Dependent Variable: Log of Operators' Wage 
Independent 
Variables  (9)  (10)  (11)  (12) 
YEAR17 
(=1  if YEAR > 16) 
Transit union 





%  change in 
population, 80-84 
Black 
(%  of pop) 
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Best available copyTable 9a (cont.)  * 
Generalized Least Squares Wage Regressions 
Dependent Variable: Log of Operators' Wage 
Independent 
Variables  (9  (10)  (11)  (12) 
Income  0.007  0.004  0.003  0.010 
(per  capita,  log)  (0.037)  (0.037)  (0.039)  (0.039) 
Poverty 
(%  of pop) 
Constant 
.................................................................. 
Buse Risquared  0.664  0.677  0.682  0.680 
Mean dep  .  var  .  2.090  2.090  2.090  2.090 
Log likelihood  717.43  723.21  722.59  724.58 
Estimated rho  0.814  0.808  0.804  0.804 
* Estimated coefficients  (standard  errors).  GLS procedure used on 
cross-sectionally heteroscedastic and time-wise autoregressive model discussed 
in Kmenta (1986).  Cross-sections restricted to have same autoregressive 
parameter.  Buse R-squared defined in Buse  (1973). 
Source: Author's calculations. 
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Best available copyTable 9b  * 
Fixed-Effects Wage  Regressions 
Dependent  Variable:  Log  of Operators'  Wage 
Independent 
Variables 
LSIZE  0.028  0.023  0.013  0.013 
(log miles)  (0.026)  (0.027)  (0.027)  (0.027) 
LPRIWAGE  0.203  0.201  0.165  0.165 
(log private wage)  (0.142)  (0.141)  (0.145)  (0.145) 
DEDREV 
($  per mile) 
Years  after 
tax enactment 
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Best available copyTable 9b  (cont.)  * 
Fixed-Effects Wage Regressions 
Dependent Variable: Log of Operators' Wage 
Independent 
Variables 
YEAR17  - - -  - - -  0.092  0.080 
(=1  if YEAR > 16)  - - -  - - -  (0.113)  (0.129) 
................................................................. 
R-  squared  0.470  0.472  0.488  0.489 
Mean dep. var.  2.090  7.219  7.219  7.219 
Log likelihood  803.60  805.31  815.41  815.59 
Hausman test stat.  24.6  17.9  1.2  39.2 
* Estimated coefficients  (standard  errors). 
Source: Author's calculations. 
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Best available copyTable 10 
Size, Revenue, Payroll, and Paygoll Share 
Fixed-Effects Regressions 
Dependent Variable 
(17)  (18)  -  (19)  (20) 
............................................. 
Payroll Share 
Independent  Log  Log  Log  (Log  Payroll - 
Variable  Size  Revenue  Payroll  Log Revenue) 
LSIZE  - - -  0.664  0.682  0.018 
(log  miles)  (0.032)  (0.027)  (0.026) 
LPRIWAGE 




(-1  if YEAR-7) 
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Best available copyTable 10 (cont.  ) 
Size,  Revenue,  Payroll,  and Paxroll Share 
Fixed-Effects Regressions 
Dependent Variable 
(17)  (18)  (19)  (20) 
............................................. 
Payroll Share 
Independent  Log  Log  Log  (Log  Payroll - 
Variable  Size  Revenue  Payroll  Log Revenue) 
YEAR17  0.362 
(=1  if YEAR > 16)  (0.165) 
DUM8  5  -0.013  0.150  0.081  -0.069 
(0.055)  (0.044)  (0.037)  (0.036) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
R-  squared  0.070  0.631  0.693  0.107 
Mean dep. var.  7.465  8.460  7.219  - 1.240 
Log-likelihood  421.08  710.34  828.07  845.47 
* 
Estimated coefficients  (standard  errors). 
Source: author's calculations. 
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Waae Rates 
$ per hour 
15.00 
0.00 
0  2  4  6  8  10  12  14  16  18 
Years since enactment of dedicated tax 
Source: Author's Calculations 
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Vehicle miles (000) 
3,000 
System Size 
2  4  6  8  10  12  14  16 
Years since enactment of dedicated tax 
Source: Author's Calculations 
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Revenues 
2  4  6  8  10  12  14  16 
Years since enactment of dedicated tax 
Source: Author's Calculations 
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Revenues 
(size  constant) 
0 
0  2  4  6  8  10  12  14  16 
Years since enactment of dedicated tax 
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